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The General Theory: a neglected work?! 
The General Theory (Keynes, 1936, hereafter G.T.) a neglected work? Am I joking? 
Few books have been subject to so much review, criticism and interpretation. Yet I 
suggest that its impact on modern economic theory, both neoClassical and Post 
Keynesian, has in fact been minimal. This theoretical neglect has also limited 
Keynes’s impact on policy, other than as a poster boy for a traditional policy of public 
works which predated The General Theory. My aim in this lecture is to  try and justify 
these claims. 
When I am not in Cambridge, I live just outside the border of an empire, appropriately 
enough for a Post Keynesian economist. My home is just north of Hadrian’s Wall, the 
northern border of the Roman Empire. In a similar way, the wall surrounding the 
citadel of neoClassical economics is its methodology. Attempts to engage or 
challenge neoClassical economics by outsiders with different methodologies, have 
been ignored or repelled. Conversely, when the imperial citizens have sought to 
colonise their neighbours, they have, despite their military discipline, met fierce 
resistance from the unruly painted tribes. Some of whom I see represented here in 
Roskilde today … in this place that, fittingly, was never conquered by the Romans. 
The General Theory is the only gateway we know, between the neoClassical citadel 
and the rest of Political Economy, although the gateway has remained locked for 
many years and its bolts and hinges are rusty. Keynes claimed that it was a major step 
forward in the development of the theory of competitive equilibrium, or supply and 
demand, that ought to have transformed that tradition and increased its scientific 
value. For many historical reasons, The General Theory was not received as a 
platform for development, but as a revolution that has fractured the study of 
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economics for three generations. The wholesale rejection of ‘supply and demand 
theory’ by many of Keynes’s followers was, I think, premature, and the subsequent 
counter-reformation has merely reinstated an intellectually more powerful version of 
the status quo ante Keynes. 
The implications of The General Theory for neoClassical theory are indeed fairly 
devastating. One can understand why the immediate followers of Keynes sought to 
rebuild economic theory on entirely different foundations. One can also understand 
the refusal of neoClassical scholars to accept that the previous century of 
formalisation of economic thinking since Ricardo had been fundamentally misguided. 
In the ensuing cacophony, Keynes’s own voice has been drowned out. 
There is, on the one hand, a great deal more common ground between the formal 
methods of Keynes and the modern Classics than is generally allowed. That is the 
main area I wish to address today. Nevertheless, The General Theory demonstrates 
that neoClassical theory depends upon the special assumption of a constant and 
reliable state of expectation. Therefore the re-unification of Political Economy 
requires movement on both sides. NeoClassicals would need to accept, for example, 
that competitive equilibrium theory has no place in the theory of growth over time. 
Post Keynesians and other heterodox economists would need to accept that 
equilibrium theory remains useful as a theory of value at a point in time, the present. 
This is still very much unfinished business, despite the passage of 75 years. 
When I say that The General Theory has had minimal impact on modern theory, I 
cannot avoid the need to state what I think The General Theory is. The neglect stems 
from the fact that each school thinks it has Keynes taped. It is well known that neither 
the neoclassical Keynesian synthesis nor Post Keynesian economics, let alone the 
current New Keynesian consensus, are the economics of Keynes. Each school has 
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taken from Keynes what they think is important and left the rest. It is my contention 
that we are much the poorer for that. There is still much to be gained from reading 
The General Theory and using it as a starting point for research. 
I have boiled down my own understanding of The General Theory to five propositions 
(see Table 1) that have helped me to make sense of Keynes, and I hope will help you. 
This is, of course, yet another interpretation and a contentious one at that, which is set 
out in full in my book The Economics of Keynes (Hayes, 2006). Yet the history of 
science tells us that it can take several generations for truly original thinkers like 
Keynes to be fully understood. For my part, I do not think we are finished with The 
General Theory. 
My five propositions relate to key concepts in economic theory. They relate to matters 
on which Keynes was either silent or cryptic, I think because of an implicit framework 
that he inherited from Alfred Marshall and believed would be shared by his readers. 
This belief turned out to be, for the most part, quite wrong. 
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[Table 1 here] 
Equilibrium 
There are at least four ways of defining equilibrium and a clash between them 
produces terminal confusion. Keynes is a Marshallian, he believes in equilibrium 
analysis but he uses it in a highly original and quite unique fashion. For the most part, 
The General Theory is good old mechanical comparative statics, with some dynamics 
between different static equilibria, for reasons that will become clear. 
Accordingly, the first important, almost certainly contentious, idea to establish is that 
the key variables in The General Theory are continuous equilibrium values. Income, 
effective demand and employment are in continuous equilibrium. 
This may be because Keynes recognises that equilibrium must be observable if 
equilibrium analysis is to be of any scientific value. Curiously he shares this 
conviction with Lucas, of all people, although their notions of equilibrium are quite 
different. Yet how can the system be in continuous equilibrium, in a theory which 
contains disequilibrium dynamics and, of course, unemployment? 
Here it is Keynes’s treatment of time that is crucial. He takes up Marshall’s distinction 
between the market, short and long periods and resolves how these should relate to 
calendar time. Recall that in Marshall, market period equilibrium is based on stocks of 
finished goods on hand; short period equilibrium allows for employment and 
production to change, given the aggregate capital stock; and long period equilibrium 
allows for the adjustment of the aggregate capital stock by the production of new 
capital-goods, i.e. investment. In both Marshall and Keynes market prices are the only 
prices that are actually observable. The short-period and long-period prices are 
expectations in the minds of entrepreneurs. 
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Now Marshall linked the market period to a calendar day, the short period to a 
calendar period of months and the long period to a calendar period of years. Yet both 
the short and the long period are for him of indefinite length, merely logical 
constructions showing the way things are heading. Marshall is quite realistic that we 
may never reach a given short or long period equilibrium; expectations may be 
disappointed on the way. Yet he retains a faith in the full employment stationary state 
as the long-term anchor of the dynamic adjustment. 
Keynes introduces greater rigour into Marshall’s approach. First of all, think of the 
terms market-period, short-period and long-period as adjectives, not substantives. 
Thus, each term refers to a type of equilibrium adjustment. The market period relates 
mainly to the clearing of goods markets, and income. The short period relates to the 
employment of labour and the other existing factors of production, and effective 
demand. The long period relates to the production of new capital goods, and the 
capital stock. It is a subtle point, but we need to distinguish the nature of the 
adjustment to equilibrium from the interval of time in which the adjustment takes 
place. We also need to distinguish the nature of the adjustment from the time horizon 
of the expectations which prompt the adjustment. 
In The General Theory, the production and employment decision involves two 
separate units of calendar time, which Keynes defines as the day and the period of 
production, which is a number of days. The day is Keynes’s quantum unit of time, 
‘the shortest interval after which the firm is free to revise its decision as to how much 
employment to offer’ (G.T. p. 47, footnote 1). It does no harm to think of this as a 
calendar day. The period of production is the macroeconomic counterpart of the 
period between starting and finishing an individual production process, or production 
period. 
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In terms of equilibrium, the day has two aspects, the market-period and the short-
period aspects. Each day, equilibrium market prices are struck for the finished goods 
delivered, thus determining current income. Also each day, equilibrium expected 
prices are struck for the production in which today’s labour is employed. The 
principle of effective demand is itself a theory of the formation of expected prices as 
equilibrium values. The prices are necessarily expected prices because today’s output 
of various products will not be finished until the end of their various production 
periods. These expected prices correspond to the effective demand, meaning the 
income expected to result from today’s employment. Employment is adjusted in 
accordance with the expected prices, so that effective demand determines 
employment. Current income and effective demand are not the same thing, yet both 
income and employment are separately in equilibrium each day, which for all 
practical purposes means, continuously. 
In a further departure from Marshall, Keynes defines the long period in a unique and 
strictly short-term technical sense, to mean the equilibrium on which employment will 
in theory converge, if a new state of expectation persists for the full length of the 
period of production. Note that this long period is not the same as the long term. 
Finally, how can we have an equilibrium with unemployment? In what I will now 
follow Keynes in calling the Classical sense, unemployment is always a sign of dis-
equilibrium. This is because the Classical notion of general equilibrium is a state in 
which all parties make their preferred choices, meaning that factor markets clear. 
Classical authors (old and new) see disequilibrium in terms of shocks to a long-period 
equilibrium based on preferences, technology and endowment. In The General 
Theory, the level of employment at any time reflects a position of short-period 
equilibrium conditional upon, not only that standard Classical list of parameters, but 
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also upon the state of psychological response of consumers and owners of wealth to 
an unknown future. In Keynes’s equilibrium analysis, these psychological factors are 
as exogenous as the Classical parameters. Furthermore, they are independent 
variables, liable to discontinuous, short-term variation. This is a kind of variation not 
shared, or fully determined, by the Classical parameters. Therefore Keynes’s system 
is not ‘closed’ like the Classical system, in which the level of employment is fully 
determined by the parameters. Keynes’s system is ‘open’ in the sense that the key 
independent variables are not endogenous, that is, not part of the equilibrium theory. 
Nevertheless, The General Theory remains a theory of the level of employment as an 
equilibrium value. Disequilibrium exists only in the sense that a short-period 
equilibrium position converges to a long-period equilibrium. 
Keynes has a notion of general equilibrium, of the equilibrium of industry as a whole 
as he puts it, which differs from the Classical. For Keynes, it is possible for the system 
as a whole to be in a state of competitive equilibrium even though not everyone is in 
their preferred position. Entrepreneurs may have no reason to change their 
employment decisions and labour has no power to make them do so. To avoid 
confusion, I use the term ‘system equilibrium’ to cover the still more general case. 
System equilibrium encompasses both Classical full-employment general equilibrium 
and Keynes’s equilibrium of ‘industry as a whole’, with or without full employment. 
Competition 
There can be little doubt that Marshall saw competition as a force similar to natural 
selection and gravity. In mechanical statics, the problem is always related to being in 
equilibrium. Marshall uses the analogy of a basin, containing a number of balls, which 
is tilted. The balls move smoothly and instantaneously to a new position of 
equilibrium, without an intervening position of dis-equilibrium. In a similar way, 
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Marshall’s and Keynes’s product prices are always equilibrium prices. Any tendency 
to diverge from market-period equilibrium is prevented by the countervailing forces 
of competition, and a change in the conditions of supply or demand leads not to 
disequilibrium, but to a change in the equilibrium price. Competition in supply and 
demand is the force that holds the system continuously in equilibrium. 
This is easier to see with market prices than with the expected prices of effective 
demand. Yet the same approach applies: competition holds employment in 
equilibrium, each day we move instantaneously to a new equilibrium position. 
Clearly what I am describing is a state of perfect competition with instantaneous price 
adjustment and clearing goods markets, though not, please note, clearing factor 
markets. What about fixed/sticky prices, nominal and real rigidities preventing 
adjustment? They are not there, or at least, they are not part of the main story. Much 
confusion has been caused by reading imperfect competition into The General 
Theory, partly through a misreading of a single phrase, the degree of competition. 
What Keynes calls ‘the degree of competition’ (G.T. p. 245) refers to the conditions of 
supply rather than to the slope of the demand curve faced by an individual firm. Joan 
Robinson wrote that ‘Keynes did not accept the “perfect competition” of the text-
books, but some vague old-fashioned notion of competition that he never formulated 
explicitly’ (Sawyer, 1992, p. 107). Taking her slightly barbed words with a due pinch 
of salt, Keynes’s degree of competition refers to competition among entrepreneurs 
and workers. It is a matter of the obstacles to the free movement of resources into and 
between industries and occupations. These obstacles are associated with what Keynes 
calls ‘closed shops’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 639, footnote 1) of either employers or 
workers,  together with the other social and institutional resistances connected with 
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voluntary unemployment. So here are the real rigidities so dear to New Keynesians, 
but they have nothing to do with Keynes’s central argument.  
The degree of competition and the degree of monopoly are not the same thing. Pace 
Davidson and Kregel, The General Theory is not compatible with monopolistic 
competition. The General Theory necessarily assumes that the degree of monopoly is 
zero, so that individuals take prices as given and independent of their own actions. In 
other words, you must approach The General Theory as written on the assumption of 
perfect competition in the modern sense. Prices are fully flexible, in the short run as 
well as the long: we will address why factor prices tend to be stable in a moment. 
The assumption of perfect competition explains a number of important aspects of The 
General Theory, including its abstraction from financial and industrial structure and 
the distribution of income. Nowhere is Keynes’s method more clear than in his 
treatment of capital-goods as if they were individually traded on the stock exchange. 
All finished goods, whether capital or consumption, new or second-hand, have 
equilibrium market prices that can be realised at any time. Here again I disagree with 
Paul Davidson. The assumption of perfect competition therefore has implications for 
the meaning of liquidity in The General Theory, and I will return to this later. 
In Marshall’s theory, it is competition that holds market prices in equilibrium and then 
drives this temporary equilibrium, as he calls it, towards the short-period and long-
period equilibrium positions over time. In respect of competition, Keynes’s theory is 
no different, even though his definitions of the short and long period equilibrium 
positions are quite different, as we have seen. The microfoundations of The General 
Theory are laid squarely upon those of Marshall, and it was not on the question of 
competition that Keynes differentiated himself from the Classical school.  
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Money 
If The General Theory is a theory of continuous equilibrium under perfect 
competition, how and why does it differ from Classical theory?  If what I have said is 
true, should we not always be in the Classical long run, where only relative prices 
matter in the allocation of resources, and money is neutral in real terms? Why does 
The General Theory not lead to the same ‘Classical dichotomy’, if it shares with 
Classical theory the concept of competitive equilibrium? 
Well, as we have already noted, Keynes’s system equilibrium is different from the 
Classical general equilibrium. In Keynes’s equilibrium, entrepreneurs are centre-
stage. The equilibrium position is determined by the spending decisions of employers, 
investors and consumers, and not by the optimal allocation of factors of production. 
Put another way, it is entrepreneurs who make the hiring decisions, not the owners of 
the factors of production. Unemployed factors cannot insist on being employed in 
return for the value of their marginal product. 
There are good reasons for preferring Keynes’s concept of equilibrium. The existence 
of a wage-dependent workforce is a sufficient condition. The monetary economy is an 
entrepreneur economy, not a co-operative or self-employed economy. It is a monetary 
production economy, meaning that production depends on the payment of wages and 
wages must be paid in money. The heterogeneity of output makes it unacceptable to 
pay workers in final product. Heterogeneity is not a minor detail of The General 
Theory, it is a direct consequence of the division of labour. Income is intrinsically 
monetary outside a corn model. This is why the appropriate concept of system 
equilibrium for a monetary production economy is the principle of effective demand. 
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Furthermore, there is a subtle, but far-reaching inconsistency in Classical theory. The 
current orthodoxy is that Classical theory describes the long-run equilibrium, which 
would be reached immediately if prices were perfectly flexible and agents fully 
competitive, while Keynesian or ‘business cycle’ theory describes the short run, since 
prices are in practice sticky. The stickiness of prices, we are told, reflects both 
nominal and real rigidities, the latter including obstacles to competition, slow 
adjustment of expectations, and in more recent theory, asymmetric information. This 
view of things should be called New Pigovian, not New Keynesian. 
On the contrary, Keynes’s principle of effective demand also assumes competitive, 
flexible prices in goods and asset markets. Only relative prices matter in the 
determination of employment; the problem is that the relative prices are ‘wrong’ as 
Leijonhufvud pointed out. The principle of effective demand can be (and is) worked 
out using the money-wage of a standard unit of labour as the unit of account: the 
employment of labour is determined completely independently of the price of labour. 
Keynes devotes most of G.T. Chapter 2 to refuting, on entirely Classical grounds, the 
idea that involuntary unemployment is the result of a failure to allow money-wages to 
clear the market. Keynes’s notion of system equilibrium does not include the clearing 
of factor markets as a necessary condition. If it did, The General Theory would no 
longer be a theory of a monetary economy. 
The inconsistency is not in Keynes’s definition of equilibrium, but in Classical theory. 
The basic tenet of Classical theory is that money is neutral; yet how are markets to 
clear, except through changes in money-prices? Relative prices are ratios of prices in 
more than one market, and there is no reason to think that a change in one price will 
leave prices in other markets unchanged. 
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The perception of sticky factor prices (there is nothing in The General Theory to 
suggest sticky goods or asset prices) reflects their exogeneity from Keynes’s 
equilibrium model. Exogenous wages are not rigid or sticky wages; on this point 
Keynes is quite explicit, both in G.T. Chapter 2 and the whole of G.T. Chapter 19. 
Yet, in a monetary economy, there has to be an anchor for the price-level if the price 
system is not to break down. Since the quantity theory assumes away the problem of 
involuntary unemployment, it cannot be invoked to explain the price-level. Classical 
theory does not take supply and demand seriously enough. 
Expectation 
So far I have argued that The General Theory is an extension of essentially Classical 
competitive equilibrium analysis, i.e. supply and demand theory, to a monetary 
economy. Taking money seriously means taking time seriously, and I have already set 
out the importance of Keynes’s redefinition of Marshall’s equilibrium periods. 
The understanding of time as irreversible has profound implications for equilibrium 
analysis. If today’s decision to produce, consume or invest is to be described as an 
equilibrium outcome, the competitive forces bringing about this equilibrium must also 
act today, in the present. Past decisions and future outcomes are strictly irrelevant. 
However, most production takes time. The decision to employ labour or invest in a 
new capital-good today depends on market prices that are expected to rule in the 
future. In the absence of a forward contract, decisions must be made on the strength of 
an expectation, something which already plays an important part in Marshall’s 
system. Keynes makes a subtle, but important, addition to the Classical scheme by 
distinguishing between short-term expectation, which governs the level of production 
and employment, and long-term expectation, which governs the investment decision. 
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The state of short-term expectation turns out to depend upon the state of long-term 
expectation, so we can follow Keynes in often referring simply to the state of 
expectation as a whole, but this shorthand must not obscure its compound nature. 
This use of the long and short term does not correspond to the long and short 
equilibrium periods. Keynes’s long-period equilibrium is based on short-term 
expectation and relates to a state of expectation which remains unchanged long 
enough to allow the capital stock to adjust fully to that state of expectation. Although 
Keynes’s long-period equilibrium is important for theoretical completeness, it is 
rather unlikely to be observed, since the state of expectation is liable to constant 
change, far more so than the parameters of the Classical system. Nevertheless, 
however much the state of expectation may shift from day to day, today’s state of 
expectation determines in the present the point of effective demand and the level of 
employment, as a position of short-period equilibrium, a shifting equilibrium. It is of 
theoretical, but less practical, importance that the state of expectation also defines 
today a position of long-period equilibrium, on which the short-period equilibrium 
will converge if today’s state of expectation continues unchanged. 
Keynes treats the state of short-term expectation as reliable, or at least discoverable by 
trial and error,—what we now call ‘rational’—given the state of long-term 
expectation; but the state of long-term expectation itself is an entirely different matter. 
Keynes does not assume long-term expectations are fulfilled even in his long-period 
equilibrium (where they are merely unchanged), and indeed considers disappointment 
more than likely. I suggest that the period over which competitive equilibrium 
analysis is of scientific value relates directly to the time horizon within which 
expectations can reasonably be treated as determinate. The method cannot be applied 
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to the long term, thus wholly undermining the Classical concept of long-period 
competitive equilibrium, i.e. mainstream intertemporal macroeconomics. 
To assume ‘rational expectations’ in the long term is heroically to assume a very 
unheroic world, in which knowledge of the present and the past is a reliable guide to 
the future. The state of long-term expectation is as exogenous in The General Theory 
as the endowment and other Classical system parameters, meaning that it is beyond 
the reach of equilibrium theory. It is a close cousin to the propensity to consume and 
the preference for liquidity, both of which also reflect the historical nature of time. 
These three psychological states represent reasonable responses by purposeful 
individuals to the problems of time, in the real world where the Classical long-period 
equilibrium is logically unattainable, and therefore an objectively optimal response is 
physically impossible. 
So now we are moving into the mysterious area of the forces of time and ignorance, 
whose analysis falls outside the equilibrium model on which I have so far placed so 
much emphasis. The particular point I address in the fifth proposition is the nature of 
liquidity, and how different Keynes’s treatment is to what you might expect. 
Liquidity  
These days, a liquid asset is understood to be one that can readily be exchanged or 
converted into money at a well-defined market price. My claim is that this does not 
capture the full meaning of liquidity in The General Theory, and that Keynes 
distinguishes between the attributes of convertibility and liquidity. There is more to 
his conception of liquidity than convertibility. In principle, an asset with low 
convertibility may have high liquidity, and vice versa, however counter-intuitive this 
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may now seem. Liquidity is intimately related with expectation in The General 
Theory, and its meaning is fundamental to the understanding of the book as a whole. 
The paradox of The General Theory is that Keynes so emphasises the liquidity of 
money within a theoretical framework, based on perfect competition, in which all 
assets are equally marketable or convertible. Why does he then discuss degrees of 
liquidity and, furthermore, suggest that in certain historic environments land has 
‘ruled the roost’ in the hierarchy of liquidity (G.T. pp. 223, 241, 358)? Land can never 
have been preferred for its convertibility, let alone as the medium of exchange. 
Keynes claims that historically land has possessed high liquidity, despite low 
convertibility. Conversely, in his discussion of organised investment markets, which 
come closest in practice to the ideal of perfect competition in terms of transaction 
costs and uniformity of price, he treats their ‘liquidity’ (which he places in inverted 
commas on no less than five occasions during his discussion in G.T. Chapter 12, pp. 
153–160) as an illusion and something distinct from true liquidity. Listed equity 
securities have high convertibility, but low liquidity. 
Although Keynes does not provide an explicit definition of liquidity in The General 
Theory, he comes close towards the end of Chapter 17 (G.T. p. 240). My view is that 
Keynes’s implicit definition of liquidity is the degree to which the value of an asset, 
measured in any given standard, is independent of changes in the state of expectation, 
as we defined it a few moments ago. Liquidity risk is therefore the possible—not the 
probable or expected—the possible loss of value as a result of a change in the state of 
expectation, which includes the state of confidence. A constantly shifting and 
precarious state of expectation means a high liquidity risk. 
In The General Theory, there is a hierarchy of liquidity risk, in which bonds are 
superior to capital-goods (for which read equities), and money is superior to bonds. 
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This hierarchy, which later theory has neglected, is of crucial importance to Keynes’s 
division between consumption and different types of investment decisions. I have 
argued elsewhere that the hierarchy provides a solid basis for Kalecki’s principle of 
increasing risk and for the dependence of industrial investment on accumulation. Yet 
very little research has started from GT Chapter 17 in which Keynes expressed his 
most subtle insights. Hansen, of course, reckoned Keynes should not have bothered. 
Keynes’s conception of liquidity is intimately bound up with his conceptions of the 
state of expectation and of the historical nature of time. Liquidity has value only 
because the future is unknown, and its value increases with our fear of what might 
happen, that we cannot prevent or insure against. In The General Theory, money is the 
liquid asset and dominant store of value, as well as the standard of value, and money’s 
liquidity is the foundation of its non-neutrality. 
In summary, I have attributed a number of propositions to The General Theory that 
will, I’m sure, not go uncontested, but that I have found to resolve most of the puzzles 
and paradoxes that have bedevilled the reading of this book. These propositions would 
shock anyone accustomed to the New Keynesian interpretation of Keynes: continuous 
equilibrium, perfect competition, flexible prices, rational short-term expectations, and 
liquidity as something more than convertibility. 
Let me conclude by relating this understanding of The General Theory back to my 
initial claim that Keynes’s work has been neglected in both theory and policy. It has 
taken several decades for New Classical economists to rediscover, without attribution 
of course,  two concepts that are central to the principle of effective demand: 
continuous equilibrium and rational expectations. However they have never come to 
grips with the need to redefine equilibrium in a monetary economy. Still less have 
they recognised the need to distinguish short from long term expectation. While it is 
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plausible to model short-term expectations as rational equilibrium values, it is 
nonsense to attempt this with long-term expectation. 
As for the Post Keynesians, well, by and large we have abandoned supply and 
demand theory, following in the footsteps of Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. 
Joan always maintained that Kalecki had made a better job of effective demand than 
Keynes. What maintains the unity of the Post Keynesian school is the recognition that, 
under either formulation, demand matters in the long run. What we have lost by 
abandoning supply and demand theory is any hope of breaching the citadel. We have 
ranged ourselves with the other heretics, outside the wall. 
What does this understanding of The General Theory mean for policy? Very briefly 
indeed, consider the following major Classical doctrines: flexible labour markets, 
floating exchange rates, and financial liberalisation, in terms of both free capital 
movement and prudential regulation. Underpinning the doctrine of flexible labour 
markets is the concept of a natural rate of unemployment. In other words, observed 
unemployment is said to be what Keynes called frictional or voluntary 
unemployment. Any temporary departure from the natural rate is held to be the result 
of wage stickiness, so that flexible labour markets are a euphemism for the traditional 
policy of wage cuts. Keynes’s proof that flexible money wages cannot clear the labour 
market as a whole has been ignored. His policy conclusions are ignored because his 
concept of equilibrium is not understood, let alone accepted. 
The Classical notion of equilibrium also underpins the doctrine of floating exchange 
rates. Competition is supposed to drive the economy to full employment with balance 
of payments equilibrium. Without the recognition that competition alone cannot do 
this and that demand matters in the long run, the concept of balance of payments 
constrained growth is incomprehensible. The case for a return to a managed exchange 
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rate system, including an onus of adjustment on countries in trade surplus, cannot be 
made within the Classical framework. The same applies to the case for the 
management of commodity prices, let alone for more radical ideas such as an 
international commodity reserve currency. 
Furthermore these policy ideas clash with the third doctrine, of the free movement of 
financial capital. In all the recent public debate about the role of Wall Street and the 
City of London, I have heard no challenge to the claim that equity markets allocate 
capital to best advantage. The incontrovertible evidence that physical industrial 
investment is almost entirely financed by accumulation is simply dismissed as a 
spurious correlation. Lacking a solid grasp of the concepts of long-term expectation 
and liquidity, Classical theory cannot explain convincingly why corporations depend 
on accumulation. Nor can it explain why equity markets provide an exit for 
entrepreneurs, a convenience for rentiers, a hunting ground for corporate raiders, and 
a plaything for speculators, anything indeed, other than an intermediary through 
which savings are channelled into investment. Yet the social case for the free 
movement of financial capital depends upon the last. 
And finally we come to financial regulation. The carnage of the last three years should 
have prompted a fundamental rethink. Yet without Keynes’s concepts of long-term 
expectation and liquidity at their disposal, governments are proving unable to resist 
the demands of powerful banks to maintain unfettered financial liberalisation on the 
strength of the flawed concept of Value at Risk underpinning Basel III. 
This lecture has been about theory rather than policy, because bad theory makes bad 
policy, as I have just outlined, and also because I do think it is true in economics that 
it takes a theory to beat a theory. This is particularly so in macroeconomics, where 
contrary evidence is so easily explained away or ignored. The General Theory is a 
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gateway into the citadel, a careful attempt to refute Classical theory on its own terms 
and rules of engagement. I believe it has still so far been underestimated, by both 
friend and foe alike. 
I have said little or nothing about the many positive Post Keynesian policy ideas. I 
know that other speakers are addressing these and I by no means deny the value of 
working out these ideas. Yet the truth is, that I entertain little hope of their gaining a 
hearing in the corridors of power at present. Not until the theoretical climate changes, 
or else the economic system collapses – not something I would wish on anyone, least 
of all a would-be Post Keynesian policymaker. 
Empires do fall and defensive walls are abandoned and tumble down. Perhaps some 
of you await the internal collapse of mainstream economics. Yet it has weathered the 
2008 crisis by keeping its head down. After a brief nod to Keynes from the foxhole, 
economic policymakers are safely back in the clutches of the Classicals. Keynes did 
not want to set up a rival school of economic thought, he wanted to transform 
economics. I think his view, and mine, is that the only way to change policy is to 
change fundamental theory. 75 years on, there is still a long way to go. 
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